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PRACTICAL AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 
IN ALSTON'S PERCEIVING GOD
John Turri
This paper clarifies and evaluates a premise of William Alston's argument in 
Perceiving God. The premise in question: if it is practically rational to engage in 
a doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to suppose that said prac­
tice is reliable. I first provide the background needed to understand how this 
premise fits into Alston's main argument. I then present Alston's main argu­
ment, and proceed to clarify, criticize, modify, and ultimately reject Alston's 
argument for the premise in question. Without this premise, Alston's main 
argument fails.
I.
This section presents the main argument of Perceiving God, along with 
minimal necessary background.1 Alston's thesis is that putative percep­
tions of God often justify beliefs about God. A subject S has a putative 
perception of God when S has an experience e in which it seems to S that 
God appears to S as ^. If, based on e, S forms the "M-belief" that God is ^, 
then S has a justified belief that God is ^. An M-belief is a belief that God is 
^, which is based on a putative perception of God. (I will often substitute 
‘q  for the proposition that God is ^.)
Alston adopts a reliabilist theory of justification, which entails that jus­
tified beliefs are reliably produced. Thus, M-beliefs could be justified only 
if putative perceptions of God reliably indicate that God is ^. In turn, this 
entails that M-beliefs could be justified only if God exists, for God could 
be ^ only if God exists. The stakes could hardly be higher: if Alston's argu­
ment succeeds, then he will have established that God exists.2
In order for S's M-belief to be justified, it must be reliably caused, but S 
does not have to be justified in believing that it is reliably caused. However, 
in order for Alston to convince us that S's M-belief is justified, he must con­
vince us of the second-order claim that S's M-belief is reliably caused.
A doxastic practice is a habit, or cluster of habits, of forming doxastic at­
titudes with certain contents, when in certain circumstances. For instance, 
the doxastic practice of Sensory Perception is (roughly) the habit of form­
ing the belief that p when you have a sensory experience as of p . There is 
also the practice of Christian Mystical Perception (CMP), which for sim­
plicity we can say is the practice of forming M-beliefs.
Those brief remarks put us in a position to appreciate Alston's main 
argument.3
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(1) If CMP is a socially established doxastic practice, then it is prima 
facie practically rational to engage in it.4 (Premise)
(2) If it is prima facie practically rational to engage in CMP, then it is 
prima facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a reliable dox- 
astic practice.5 (Premise)
(3) If it is prima facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a reliable 
doxastic practice, then if CMP both exhibits significant self-support 
and is not demonstrably unreliable (because of either massive in­
ternal inconsistency or pervasive conflict with some other, more 
firmly established doxastic practice), then it is unqualifiedly epis- 
temically rational to regard CMP as a reliable doxastic practice.6 
(Premise)
(4) If it is unqualifiedly epistemically rational to regard CMP as a reli­
able doxastic practice, then it is epistemically rational to infer that 
an M-belief that q entails that q is likely true.7 (Premise)
(5) CMP is a socially established doxastic practice.8 (Premise)
(6) It is prima facie practically rational to engage in CMP. (Modus Po- 
nens: 1, 5)
(7) It is prima facie epistemically rational to regard CMP as a reliable 
doxastic practice. (Modus Ponens: 2, 6)
(8) If CMP both exhibits significant self-support and is not demonstra­
bly unreliable, then it is unqualifiedly epistemically rational to re­
gard CMP as a reliable doxastic practice. (Modus Ponens: 3, 7)
(9) CMP both exhibits significant self-support9 and is not demonstra­
bly unreliable.10 (Premise)
(10) It is unqualifiedly epistemically rational to regard CMP as a reliable 
doxastic practice. (Modus Ponens: 8, 9)
(11) It is epistemically rational to infer that an M-belief that q entails that 
q is likely true. (Modus Ponens: 4, 10)
(12) Therefore, an M-belief that q entails that q is likely true.11 (By ratio­
nal inference, 11)
Up until the last step, the argument is valid. The last step is not, strictly 
speaking, valid, but I will not quibble with it, because the inference never­
theless appears persuasive. Rather than dispute the logic of the argument, 
I will argue against premise (2).
It will be important later that we understand Alston's target audience. 
He aims to "provide anyone, participant in CMP or not, with sufficient rea­
sons for taking CMP to be rationally engaged in."12 The argument just re­
viewed is intended to answer an "external question," to wit, "Why should 
we," the community of epistemologists and other interested parties, "sup­
pose that this whole way of forming and supporting beliefs is at all likely 
to give us true beliefs about reality?"13 We will not specifically address the 
"internal question" of whether CMP is coherent and self-supporting.
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Let us inquire into the supposed connection between practical and epis- 
temic justification. Let me first note that in the following discussion 'jus­
tification' and 'rationality' are used interchangeably, primarily because 
Alston himself slides back and forth between the two. To begin with, 
Alston clearly distinguishes epistemic from practical justification:
For one to be epistemically justified in holding a belief, as opposed to 
prudentially or morally justified is for it to be a good thing, from the 
epistemic point of view, for one to believe that p. We may think of the 
epistemic point of view as defined by the aim at [sic] maximizing 
the number of one's true beliefs and minimizing the number of one's 
false beliefs.14
Epistemic justification, then, is concerned with truth, whereas practical 
justification is primarily concerned not with truth, but with prudential 
and moral considerations—e.g., with how well a belief contributes to our 
success, happiness, rectitude, and so on.15 Given the inescapable differ­
ence between practical and epistemic justification, Alston must concede 
that there is no conceptual entailment from the former to the latter.16 He 
also concedes that the practical rationality of participating in a doxastic 
practice is not even evidence for its reliability.17
There is good reason to deny that practical justification provides evi­
dence for reliability. Happiness might demand believing what is false. 
Perhaps some unremarkable people can be happy and successful only 
if they falsely believe that they possess stunning looks, an incomparable 
intellect, or devastating charm. Or to take a more relevant case, due to 
their inability to cope with the stressful prospects of mortality and death, 
some people might come to practice a certain religion because it promises 
everlasting life, and they are much happier as a result. To take an actual 
case, pecuniary self-interest no doubt perpetuated the belief among many 
nineteenth-century slaveholders that black people were inherently infe­
rior, naturally fit for slavery, indeed improved by the institution of slavery. 
We could multiply examples ad nauseum. The main point is that it is at 
least as plausible to assume that socially established doxastic practices 
persist because they make people "feel good" as it is to assume that they 
persist because they produce mostly true beliefs.
Given that we all agree that practical rationality is not evidence of reli­
ability, it may come as a surprise that Alston nevertheless accepts premise 
(2), and urges us to accept it, too. I devote the remainder of this paper to 
clarifying and evaluating his main argument for (2), what we may call 
"the argument from pragmatic implication."
We begin by distinguishing judgment from commitment. If I judge 
some doxastic practice a  "to be rational[,] I am thereby committing myself 
to the rationality of judging a  to be reliable."18 I do not actually thereby 
judge a  to be reliable, but only commit myself to the rationality of suppos­
ing it to be. What does that mean? It means that, were the question to arise, 
it would be irrational for me to disbelieve that it is reliable or suspend 
judgment on the matter. In such a circumstance, if I have any epistemic
II.
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attitude toward the proposition <a is reliable>, it must be that I judge that 
a  is reliable, on pain of irrationality.
Alston likens this to Moore's Paradox.19 Something would be seriously 
wrong with Jones were he to sincerely utter, "It's raining, but I don't be­
lieve it is." The following propositions are logically independent:
(13) It is raining (here, now).
(14) I believe that it is raining (here, now).
(13) is logically consistent with the negation of (14). Nevertheless, it is 
plainly irrational for Jones to simultaneously assert (13) and deny (14). 
Call this a "Moore-paradoxical utterance." While a Moore-paradoxical 
utterance is surely infelicitous, it also suggests an epistemic defect. Some­
thing has gone seriously wrong with Jones if he can express his belief that 
it is raining, while at the same time disbelieve that he has the belief just 
expressed.20 How could he be so disconnected from the very belief that he 
presently gives voice to? Alston believes that "this is just the situation we 
have with a  is rational and it is rational to take a  to be reliable."21
Are the two cases similar? No. Moore's Paradox raises a problem about 
an odd pair of beliefs, suggestive of epistemic failure, and which simul­
taneously cannot be expressed felicitously. Alston's case presents neither 
symptom. Consider:
(15) It is practically rational to engage in a.
(16) I believe that a  is reliable [or: a  gives rise to mostly true beliefs].
Assenting to (15) while denying (16) does not suggest an epistemic fail­
ure. Neither does it strike me as odd or infelicitous. We as observers can 
concede that a  is a long-standing, socially established, widely accepted 
doxastic practice, and that people in certain circumstances can have over­
whelming practical reason to participate in a . Indeed, let us suppose that 
for them to shirk a  would be grossly negligent from the standpoint of 
practical reason. How does this relate to whether the resulting a -beliefs 
are appropriate from the epistemic point of view? As far as I can see, it is 
irrelevant. Perhaps a  prescribes hasty generalization or prejudicial bias, 
yet neither procedure appears likely to generate true beliefs.
(15) and (16) are neither conceptually, evidentially, nor otherwise re­
lated in such a way that one cannot, from the epistemic point of view, 
justifiably believe (15) and deny (16). Likewise, nothing prevents one from 
felicitously expressing both those beliefs in the same breath.22
This demonstrates that (15) need not commit an outsider to (16). Hence, 
Alston fails to satisfactorily answer the external question.23 Nevertheless, 
Alston might have a point to make regarding a slightly different question, 
a "quasi-external" question: why should we suppose that engaging in a  
will make it epistemically irrational for the participants of a  to deny that 
forming beliefs within a  is likely to result in true beliefs?24
Alston suggests an answer to the quasi-external question.
It is irrational to engage in a , to form beliefs in the ways constitutive
of that practice, and refrain from acknowledging them as true, and
hence the practice as reliable, if the question arises.25
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If one cannot engage in a  and refuse to admit that the practice is reliable 
if the question arises, then in judging that the former is rational one has 
committed oneself to the latter's being rational.26
It is the insiders, the participants of a, who are bound by the pragmatic 
implication.27 So the analogy with Moore's Paradox should consist of the 
following propositions:
(15') It is practically rational for me to engage in a.
(16) I believe that a  is reliable [or: a  gives rise to mostly true beliefs].
But there is no pragmatic implication here either. Suppose Smith recog­
nizes that he has overwhelming practical reason to engage in a, thus as­
senting to (15'). Now suppose that the canons of a  make no pretension to 
reliability. The guiding epistemic principle of a  is to believe in accordance 
with the available evidence. Yet the canons of a  also caution that we have 
no evidence whatsoever that believing in accordance with the evidence 
is robustly truth-conducive. That is considered a "para-evidential" ques­
tion. In other words, we have no evidence that evidence is reliable, so we 
should suspend judgment on whether a  is reliable. Accordingly, Smith 
denies (16).28 Yet Smith is not thereby epistemically irrational. Indeed, ac­
cording to the epistemic standards of the practice he has most practical 
reason to engage in, a , he has come to the appropriate conclusion.
Alston might respond that justification entails reliability, so Smith 
could not consistently believe that he was justified in denying (16) while 
engaging in a. But this assumes that Alston's preferred reliabilist concept 
of justification applies across doxastic practices. However, this response is 
unavailable to Alston, for it explicitly contradicts his view that there are no 
universal, inter-practice epistemic standards.29
Thus far we have concentrated on arguments that would make epis- 
temic conclusions fall out from considerations of practical rationality.30 
This is apparently what Alston intends to prove, and indeed needs to 
prove in order for his argument to have any bearing on whether observers 
or participants of a  should, from the epistemic point of view, believe that 
a  is reliable, and thereby conclude that first-order a-beliefs are reliably 
produced. But at the end of his argument for premise (2), Alston makes a 
baffling comment. He entertains the same basic criticism of his view as I 
have been making, to the effect that he has "not shown that it is rational in 
an epistemic sense that a  is reliable." Alston responds,
This must admitted. We have not shown the reliability attribution to 
be rational in a truth-conducive sense of rationality, one that itself 
is subject to a reliability constraint. But that does not imply that our 
argument is without epistemic significance. It all depends on what 
moves are open to us. If . . . we are unable to find noncircular indica­
tions of the truth of the reliability judgment, it is certainly relevant to 
show that it enjoys some other kind of rationality. It is, after all, not 
irrelevant to our basic aim at believing the true and abstaining from 
believing the false, that a  and other established doxastic practices 
constitute the most reasonable procedures to use, so far as we can 
judge, when trying to realize that aim.31
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This response either misses the point or begs the question. First, when he 
claims, "it is certainly relevant to show that it enjoys some other kind of 
rationality," what does he mean by 'relevant'? The question is whether 
practical justification is relevant to epistemic justification, so merely as­
serting that it is begs the question. Second, when he states, "they are the 
most reasonable procedures to use, so far as we can tell," what does he 
mean by 'reasonable'? We granted for the sake of argument that they are 
the most practically reasonable, but Alston was supposed to show us that 
this affects what is most epistemically reasonable (i.e., truth-conducive, 
reliable). Presumably, he isn't simply reiterating what we have already 
assumed; otherwise, what is the point of making the argument? He appar­
ently believes he establishes something more. If that something concerns 
epistemic rationality, then he begs the question.
The most one can get out of Alston's discussion is something like the 
following principle.
(17) IF it is practically rational for S to both engage in a  and suppose that 
if it is practically rational to engage in a, then a-beliefs are reliably 
produced and thereby epistemically justified, THEN S is practically 
rational in believing that a-beliefs are reliably caused and thereby 
epistemically justified.
But (17) does not serve Alston's purpose. Replacing premise (2) with it 
would severely restrict his options. We could never get to the conclusion 
that M-beliefs likely true. We could not even get the conclusion that par­
ticipants of CMP are epistemically justified in believing that M-beliefs are 
likely true. The most we get is that they are practically rational in believing 
that they are epistemically justified in believing that M-beliefs are likely 
true. This conclusion, however, has no bearing on the epistemology of M- 
beliefs.
I conclude that premise (2) of Alston's argument is false. No suitable 
replacement suggests itself. The main argument of Perceiving God fails.32
Huron University College
NOTES
1. William P. Alston, Perceiving God: The Epistemology o f Religious Experi­
ence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). Unless otherwise noted, citations 
refer to this work.
2. Fully and formally spelled out, the reasoning in question would pro­
ceed as follows:
a. Religious experience provides, to the subject undergoing it, justifi­
cation for believing that God manifests himself. (Premise)
b. Religious experience provides, to the subject undergoing it, justifi­
cation for believing that God manifests himself o n ly  if  religious ex­
perience is a reliable indication that God manifests himself. (Prem- 
ise—from the reliabilist theory of justification)
c. Religious experience is a reliable indication that God manifests him­
self o n ly  if  God exists. (Premise)
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d. Therefore, religious experience provides, to the subject undergoing 
it, justification for believing that God manifests himself o n ly  if  God 
exists. (Hypothetical Syllogism: b, c)
e. Therefore, God exists. (Modus Ponens: a, d)
Several quotes from Alston indicate this line of reasoning:
If putative perception of God can serve to justify beliefs about God's 
perceivable qualities and activities, that tends to show that this putative 
perception is the genuine article. . . . We have to stop short of the claim 
that the perceptual justification of perceptual beliefs entails that the ex­
perience is genuine perception. I may be perceptually justified in believ­
ing that there is a lake in front of me even if I am a victim of a mirage 
and no lake is being perceived. But this is just an isolated incident that 
occurs against the background of innumerable cases in which percep­
tual justification involves authentic perception of the object. It strains 
credulity to suppose that an entire sphere of putatively perceptual ex­
perience could be a source of justification for perceptual beliefs, while 
there is no, or virtually no, genuine perception of the objects involved. 
Therefore, if putative experience of God provides justification for beliefs 
about God, that provides very strong support for supposing that such 
experiences are, at least frequently, genuine perceptions of God. . . . [This 
all] depends on whether the concept of justification involved exhibits 
'truth conducivity,' that is, on whether my being justified in believing 
that p entails that it is at least likely that it is true that p . Those who use a 
non-truth-conducivity conception of justification will, naturally enough, 
deny that the fact that sense experience provides justification for beliefs 
about physical objects is a good reason for supposing that putative sense 
perception of physical objects is often the real thing. . . . But if, on the 
other hand, our conception of justification does exhibit truth conduciv- 
ity, as mine will, the argument does go through. If being based on puta­
tive perceptions of X renders beliefs about X likely to be true, it must be 
that, in general, such experiences are in the kind of effective contact with 
facts about X that render them genuine perceptions of X. (pp. 68-69)
I want to address people who antecedently reject [the assumptions that 
people genuinely perceive God and that God exists] as well as those 
who accept [those assumptions]. Thus I am conducting the discussion 
from a standpoint outside any practice of forming beliefs on the basis of 
those alleged perceptions. And so far as I can see, the only way of argu­
ing, from that standpoint, that people do genuinely perceive God is to 
argue for the epistemological position that beliefs formed on the basis of 
such (putative) perceptions are (prima facie) justified. If that is the case, 
we have a good reason for regarding many of the putative perceptions 
as genuine; for if the subject were not often really perceiving X[,] why 
should the experience involved provide justification for beliefs about 
X? This reverses the usual order of procedure in which we first seek to 
show that S really did perceive X and then go on to consider what be­
liefs about X, if any, are justified by being based on that perception. But 
we can proceed in that order only if we are working from within a per­
ceptual belief-forming practice. The question of the genuineness of the 
alleged perception can be tackled from the outside only by defending 
the epistemological assumptions embedded in the practice in question. 
Thus the case for the reality of the perception of God will emerge from 
the book as a whole, most of which is one long argument for the thesis
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that certain kinds of beliefs about God can be justified by being based on 
putative perceptions of God. (p. 10)
I have been speaking in terms of epistemic justification, rather than in 
terms of knowledge, and the focus will be on the former rather than the 
latter. This is partly because I can't know that God is loving unless it is 
true that God is loving, and the latter in turn implies that God exists, 
something I will not be arguing in the book, except by way o f arguing that 
some beliefs about God are justified. (p. 2, emphasis added)
3. See esp. pp. 194 and 278-79. I find those passages to be most helpful in 
understanding the book's overall argument, even more so than the “Preview 
of Chapters" in the Introduction.
4. See chap. 4, esp. pp. 149-50 and 168-69, for the general argument, and 
chap. 5 for its application to CMP.
5. See chap. 4, esp. pp. 168-70 and 178-80 for the general argument, and 
chap. 5 for its application to CMP. In Alston's own words, “The final conclu­
sion I want to take from this chapter for use in the rest of the b o o k - for any 
established doxastic practice it is rational to suppose that it is reliable, and hence 
rational to suppose that its doxastic outputs are prima facie justified," p. 183.
6. Chap. 5, esp. the “Conclusion" on p. 225. In the epistemology litera­
ture, when speaking of justification, instead of the term 'unqualified,' some 
authors speak of 'ultima facie' or 'all things considered' justification. See, e.g., 
James Pryor, “There is Immediate Justification," in Contemporary Debates in 
Epistemology, ed. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Blackwell, 2005), p. 183; and 
Matthias Steup, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Prentice Hall, 
1996), p. 40.
7. Chap. 2, esp. pp. 68-69.
8. Chap. 5.
9. Pp. 250-54.
10. Chapters 6 and 7.
11. See pp. 10, 68-69, 94.
12. P. 283. It is unclear whether anything remotely resembling Alston's 
main argument would be acceptable to “mainline" Christians. Nevertheless, 
Alston certainly believes that his work could be relevant in the lives of main­
line Christians. See the parable of Denise at the very end of the book, wherein 
Denise, “perhaps inspired by contemporary work in epistemology," is able to 
rekindle her dwindling faith, rejoin Christ's flock, and reap the salvific bless­
ings of the church.
13. P. 99. The external question is answered in Chaps. 4-7, from which I 
have reconstructed what I call “Alston's main argument."
14. P. 72. (I added emphasis to 'morally' because consistency seems to call 
for it.)
15. Robert Nozick's experience-machine example demonstrates that con­
siderations of truth do weigh on the scales of practical reason. But this is ac­
complished only by holding all other things equal. Consequently, it does not 
establish that considerations of truth are on a par with those of happiness, 
prudence, or morality; it only gets truth on the table. See Nozick, Anarchy, 
State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), 42-45.
16. “It is clear that the [practical] rationality of a practice does not entail its 
reliability," p. 178.
17. “I fail to discern any evidential tie; how could the practical rationality 
of engaging in SP be evidence for its reliability?" p. 178.
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18. In what follows, I substitute 'a ' where Alston uses 'SP.' 'SP' is an acro­
nym for the doxastic practice of forming beliefs on the basis of sensory expe­
riences. Since Alston takes this argument to apply to all doxastic practices, I 
want the discussion to proceed on the most general level. I also want to avoid 
letting presumptions regarding SP creep into the evaluation of the argument.
19. Whereas this is not entirely clear in the body of the text, Alston ex­
presses himself more clearly in notes 51 and 52 on pp. 179 and 180. As a ref­
eree pointed out, Alston does not use the name 'Moore' in those footnotes. 
However, Alston's discussion leaves no doubt that he draws heavily upon 
what is standardly referred to as “Moore's Paradox," so named after G. E. 
Moore. Moore originally pointed out that it is exceedingly odd, even repug­
nant, to say, “It's raining, but I don't believe it is." Alston makes the point 
utilizing a different conjunction, “My car is in the garage, but I don't believe 
that it is." Crucially, Alston points out, “This is just the situation we have with 
SP is rational and it is rational to take SP to be reliable," and claims that both 
examples—the one about his garage, and the one about the doxastic practice, 
SP—are examples of the same phenomenon: “pragmatic implication." In light 
of all this, my critique in this section fairly relies on important dissimilarities 
between Moore's and Alston's examples. For an introduction to Moore's Para­
dox, see Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person, 
ed. Mitchell S. Green and John N. Williams (Oxford, 2007).
20. Contrast this with a case where Benny expresses his belief that it is 
raining, but lacks the belief that he believes that it is raining, because he lacks 
the concept BELIEF. Perhaps young children and sophisticated non-human 
animals are in this position. We can understand this—it does not puzzle us— 
and their failure to have, or express, the relevant second-order belief indicates 
no epistemic failing on their part. Jones, by contrast, fully possesses the con­
cept BELIEF, and expressly denies that he has the first-order belief that he 
expresses in the same breath.
21. P. 180, n. 52.
22. At this point, it might be useful to distinguish my argument from Mat­
thias Steup's critique of Alston. Steup's discussion proceeds by indicating 
several points where “a skeptic about justification" could object to Alston's 
argument. Steup faults Alston for the latter's “preemptive" and “unjustified" 
treatment of the skeptic. In particular, Steup disagrees with Alston's estimation 
that the skeptic is “irrational." Steup's response involves distinguishing levels 
of epistemic commitment in order to show that Alston doesn't fully appreci­
ate the skeptic's available resources. (Here Steup's distinction may remind us 
of a similar distinction made by Keith Lehrer, who distinguishes mere belief 
from the more reflective and refined attitude of acceptance; see Lehrer, Theory 
o f Knowledge [Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990].) See Matthias Steup's criti­
cal study of Perceiving God in Nous, vol. 31, no. 3 (1997), pp. 408-20, esp. pp. 
412-15 (though I would be remiss if I failed to also direct the reader's attention 
to the memorable example of the psychopathic killer castaways on p. 417).
By contrast, my discussion proceeds independently of any invocation, 
evaluation, or defense of skepticism, including the distinction between levels 
of epistemic commitment. In assessing Alston's argument, I object on grounds 
that any native speaker would recognize, which is, from my perspective, to 
the good.
23. To remind the reader, the external question is, “why should we [i.e., 
the community of epistemologists concerned with the rationality of religious 
belief] suppose that this whole way of forming and supporting beliefs is at all 
likely to give us true beliefs about reality?" p. 99.
24. I call this “quasi-external" because it is a question posed from the out­
side about those participating in the practice. Strictly speaking, it is different
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from a question posed from the outside about the practice itself. Perhaps this 
difference does not amount to much in the end, but I'm trying to give Alston 
every benefit of the doubt.
25. P. 179.
26. P. 179.
27. This is the other reason I characterize Alston's discussion at the most 
general level, substituting 'a ' where Alston speaks of 'SP.' We all participate 
in SP, so it is easy to confuse the external and quasi-external questions. Those 
of us observing (evaluating) the practice also participate in it. We might easily 
confuse what we are committed to as observers versus as participants. Regard­
ing a, this is not an issue.
28. He does not utter 'I disbelieve that a  is reliable,' for that is not sup­
ported by the evidence. Instead, he utters 'It is not the case that I believe that 
a  is reliable.'
29. “Each practice . . . carries its own distinctive modes of justification, 
its own distinctive principles that lay down sufficient conditions for justifica­
tion, not only prima facie justification but also, though its overrider system, 
unqualified justification as well." There is no “underlying unity" to distinct 
doxastic practices. See p. 162, “The Irreducible Plurality of Practices."
30. Philip Quinn criticizes Alston's response to the problem of religious 
diversity, on what some might think are broadly similar grounds, so I will 
presently explain how my discussion differs from Quinn's.
Quinn suggests that, upon being confronted with fundamental religious 
disagreement, instead of “sitting tight" with one's antecedent religious be­
liefs, as Alston advocates, one might also reasonably adopt a Kantian view 
of religious belief. A Kantian view of religious belief has it that our culture 
or psychology deeply affects our understanding of ultimate reality. We can 
never fully and accurately understand God, as he is in himself. As such, a 
modest and perfectly reasonable response to the epistemic problem posed by 
religious diversity would be to prune (or “thin," as Quinn puts it) our theo­
logical commitments, so that we are no longer in fundamental disagreement. 
We could attribute (at least many) disagreements to our respective cultural 
or psychological differences. See Philip Quinn, “Towards Thinner Theologies: 
Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity," reprinted in The Philosophical Chal­
lenge o f Religious Diversity, ed. Philip Quinn and Kevin Meeker (Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 2000), pp. 226-43.
Alston himself considers and rejects a proposal along these lines, contend­
ing that religious people are decidedly “pre-Kantian in their realist under­
standing of their beliefs. They think that these beliefs embody true accounts of 
the Ultimate as it really is in itself and in its relations to the Creation," p. 265.
My critique operates independently of the problem of religious diversity, 
and independently of the pre-Kantian/Kantian distinction and its attendant 
controversy. Accordingly, my critical discussion rests on ground different 
from Quinn's. My main critical points are aimed directly at Alston's positive 
argument for accepting the linkage between practical and epistemic justifica­
tion, i.e., the argument from pragmatic implication. Quinn's case relies on a 
controversial characterization of the nature of religious belief, whereas my 
case relies primarily on what any competent native speaker would, or would 
not, recognize as an infelicitous utterance.
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